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FOREWORD

PROCEDURE AS PALIMPSEST

†

CATHERINE T. STRUVE

Ask an artist about the importance of “Twombly,” and he or she
will likely think you are referring to Cy Twombly. Ask a lawyer about
the importance of “Twombly,” and she will undoubtedly understand
1
you to be asking about Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. That the Supreme Court’s landmark pleading decision from the spring of 2007
bears the same name as the abstract painter is purely coincidental; but
on consideration, the Twombly decision bears some similarity to
Twombly’s work. Take any of a number of Twombly paintings from
the late 1950s through the 1970s, and you will find indistinct forms
that can be interpreted in numerous ways and erasures that are as sig2
nificant as the marks scribbled atop them. Twombly’s paintings have
been characterized as palimpsests—images in which the most recent
3
marks do not fully obscure the earlier patterns. Likewise, one of

†

Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I thank the members of the
Executive Committee of the Civil Procedure Section of the Association of American
Law Schools for selecting the three articles in this collection, and Thom Main for serving as the moderator of the meeting at which these papers were presented. I am indebted to Stephen Burbank and Kevin Clermont for very helpful comments on prior
drafts of this Foreword.
1
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2
See generally KIRK VARNEDOE, CY TWOMBLY: A RETROSPECTIVE (1994) (accompanying and cataloging an exhibition of Twombly’s work at the Museum of Modern Art
in New York).
3
See, e.g., ROLAND BARTHES, Cy Twombly, ou ‘Non multa sed multum,’ in V ROLAND
BARTHES: OEUVRES COMPLÈTES 703, 710 (Éric Marty ed., new rev. ed. 2002) (“[L]a
main a tracé quelque chose comme une fleur et puis s’est mise à traîner sur cette trace;
la fleur a été écrite, puis désécrite; mais les deux mouvements restent vaguement
surimprimés; c’est un palimpseste pervers . . . .”). The third edition of Webster’s defines
a palimpsest as, inter alia, “a parchment, tablet, or other portion of writing material

(421)
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4

Twombly’s key features is an erasure: Twombly “retire[s]” the Court’s
statement a half-century earlier in Conley v. Gibson “that a complaint
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
5
his claim which would entitle him to relief.” The indeterminate new
marks made by Twombly caused urgent debate: how should courts interpret—and how broadly should they apply—the Twombly Court’s
conclusion that the plaintiffs’ antitrust complaint must be dismissed
6
because their claim of conspiracy was not “plausible”? Just under two
years later, the Court answered the question of scope: it made clear in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal that Twombly’s new approach to pleading applies to all
7
cases in federal court—not merely to complex antitrust class actions.
To interpret Twombly and Iqbal, we must view those decisions in
the light of the procedural law that forms their background. The
three articles in this collection do so in distinct but complementary
ways. And in so doing, they examine not only pleading standards but
other interlocking aspects of contemporary civil procedure. Professor
Edward Hartnett’s close analysis of Twombly and Iqbal focuses our attention on underlying historical assumptions concerning the plausibility of inferences. Through this analysis, he suggests to advocates the
importance of educating judges concerning such questions of plausibility in the context of the particular case. Professor Hartnett also examines the connection between motions to dismiss and discovery, and
he finds that, even post-Iqbal, the district judge enjoys discretion to
permit targeted discovery—pending the disposition of a motion to
dismiss—in ways that may promote the survival of claims that might
otherwise be dismissed. In considering Professor Elizabeth Schneider’s article, we step several paces further back, so that our field of vision takes in not only pleading but also summary judgment and the evidentiary principles that govern expert testimony. Professor Schneider
argues forcefully that these doctrines combine to tilt the balance against
plaintiffs in civil rights and employment actions, and she considers the
that has been used twice or three times after the earlier writing has been erased.”
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1625 (3d ed. 1981).
4
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.
5
355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
6
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (“Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged their
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.”).
7
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions,’ and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike.” (citation omitted)).
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implications of this insight for the role of federal judges in these important categories of litigation. Professor Scott Dodson broadens our field
of inquiry further still, by suggesting that we evaluate the effects of
Twombly and Iqbal in the light of pleading standards not only in the
United States but also abroad. In combination, these articles have
much to tell us, not just about Twombly and Iqbal, but about developments in U.S. federal civil procedure and the consequences of those
developments for the enforcement of substantive rights.
In Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, Professor Hartnett begins by
examining the reasoning behind the Twombly Court’s holding that a
complaint alleging a “contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce” in violation of section 1 of the Sherman
8
Act cannot “survive a motion to dismiss when it alleges that major telecommunications providers engaged in certain parallel conduct unfavorable to competition, absent some factual context suggesting
9
He
agreement, as distinct from identical, independent action.”
summarizes the scholarly criticism of Twombly and notes in particular
the concern that “the Court imposed a heightened specificity standard of pleading and that plaintiffs will lack the evidence to plead
10
these specifics prior to discovery.” Professor Hartnett observes that
though Twombly could have been read as a decision concerning the
substantive requirements for an antitrust conspiracy claim—rather
than as a decision that bears on pleading standards generally—there
11
was ample support in the Twombly opinion for the contrary reading.
And, as Professor Hartnett explains, lower federal courts promptly
12
applied Twombly in a range of substantive areas outside antitrust.
Professor Hartnett also considers the possibility that Twombly could
have been viewed as focusing on “complex cases involving the likelih13
ood of extremely expensive discovery.” Again, he notes that passages
of broad language in Twombly cut against such a limiting interpretation. Moreover, he suggests, reading Twombly to alter the pleading
standard in complex cases with expensive discovery “would put the

8

Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 548-49.
10
Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473,
474 (2010).
11
Id. at 475-79.
12
Id. at 479-80.
13
Id. at 478.
9
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decision in serious tension with the transsubstantive approach of the
14
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”
Here Professor Hartnett identifies one of the major current challenges for federal civil procedure. Should the Civil Rules continue to
take a rigorously transsubstantive approach that applies the same pro15
visions to the most complex and the simplest of cases? If so, do we
run the risk that the Rules will be adapted to the needs of the complex cases in a way that distorts their application to smaller, simpler
disputes? In one respect, the Civil Rules explicitly depart from a
transsubstantive approach by exempting specified types of cases from
16
Rule 26(a)’s initial-disclosure requirement, Rule 26(d)’s discovery
17
18
moratorium, and Rule 26(f )’s conference procedure. More recently—and without crafting a special rule for particular types of cases—
the rulemakers altered Rule 26 to take special account of actions in
19
which electronic discovery is particularly burdensome. And, of course,
the Civil Rules’ pleading standards have never been entirely transsubs-

14

Id. at 480.
See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L.
REV. 535, 542 (“[T]he normative question whether we are well served today by a rulemaking enterprise that continues to frame rules and amendments for all cases filed in
federal district court, no matter what the source or content of the substantive law, has
been a subject of vigorous discussion and debate in the literature.”).
16
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B) (exempting from the initial-disclosure requirement actions for review on an administrative record, in rem forfeiture actions arising
from a federal statute, habeas petitions and other challenges to a criminal conviction,
pro se actions by federal or state prisoners, actions concerning administrative summonses or subpoenas, federal government actions to recover benefit payments, federal
government actions to collect on student loans, proceedings ancillary to proceedings
in other courts, and arbitration-award enforcement proceedings).
17
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1) (“A party may not seek discovery from any source
before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f ), except in a proceeding
exempted from initial disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(B), or when authorized by these
rules, by stipulation, or by court order.”).
18
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f )(1) (“Except in a proceeding exempted from initial disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(B) or when the court orders otherwise, the parties must
confer as soon as practicable—and in any event at least 21 days before a scheduling
conference is to be held or a scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b).”).
19
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (“A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought must show that the information is
not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is made,
the court may nonetheless order discovery from such sources if the requesting party
shows good cause, considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C). The court may
specify conditions for the discovery.”).
15
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tantive; Civil Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement for pleading fraud or
20
mistake dates back to 1938. But these are exceptions; in the main, the
Civil Rules couple a transsubstantive approach with numerous grants of
discretion that, in practice, allow the district court to tailor its practice to
the needs of the particular case. Whether that largely transsubstantive
approach will continue to hold is a key question.
In any event, as Professor Hartnett notes, the reach of Twombly has
21
now been settled. Iqbal involved very different facts and claims than
Twombly. Javaid Iqbal, a Muslim citizen of Pakistan, brought constitutional claims against a number of federal officials stemming from his
22
detention on federal charges after September 11, 2001. At issue in
the appeal that reached the Supreme Court were Iqbal’s claims
against Robert Mueller (the Director of the FBI) and John Ashcroft
(the former United States Attorney General). Iqbal alleged that Mueller and Ashcroft were responsible for his subjection to abusive condi23
tions of confinement based on his race, religion, or national origin.
A closely divided Supreme Court held that Iqbal’s allegations failed to
24
state a claim against those two defendants. The Court first addressed
the substantive law governing Iqbal’s claims, and concluded that those
claims required discriminatory purpose on the part of Mueller and
25
Ashcroft. Though Iqbal did allege such a purpose, the Court found
those allegations conclusory and disregarded them; and the Court
held that the complaint’s remaining allegations failed to render Iqbal’s claims against Mueller and Ashcroft plausible because, in the
20

See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”). Stephen
Burbank has noted that Rule 9(b) is not substance specific in the way that a rule targeting only particular types of claims would be substance specific. See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677,
1732 n.248 (2004) (“A Federal Rule requiring heightened pleading in ‘all averments of
fraud or mistake’ is one thing. A proposed Federal Rule attempting to impose heightened pleading requirements as to a particular substantive claim would be quite
another . . . .” (citation omitted)).
21
Hartnett, supra note 10, at 481.
22
See First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand ¶¶ 1, 9, at 2-4, Elmaghraby v.
Ashcroft, No. 04-1809, 2005 WL 2375202 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005) [hereinafter Iqbal
Complaint].
23
Id. ¶¶ 1-3, 10, 11, at 2-5.
24
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009).
25
See id. at 1948 (2009) (“Where the claim is invidious discrimination in contravention of the First and Fifth Amendment . . . the plaintiff must plead and prove that
the defendant acted with discriminatory purpose.”).
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Court’s view, it was more likely that Mueller and Ashcroft’s actions were
motivated by legitimate law-enforcement purposes than by a discrimina26
tory purpose. In the process, the Court roundly rejected any attempt
to cabin Twombly as an antitrust decision: Twombly, the Iqbal Court
27
stated, “expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions.’”
What, then, is the content of that universally applicable pleading
standard? In Part II of his article, Professor Hartnett offers an important and helpful interpretation of Twombly’s plausibility requirement.
Professor Hartnett rejects the view that Twombly permits dismissal of a
complaint because the district judge finds the facts alleged or the legal
28
theory advanced in the complaint to be implausible. Rather, he suggests, the plausibility analysis that Twombly invites concerns the plausi29
bility of the inferences to be drawn from the facts. Thus, he argues,
“Twombly’s insistence that the inference of conspiracy be ‘plausible’ is
equivalent to the traditional insistence that an inference be ‘reasona30
ble.’” And the plausibility of the inference, Professor Hartnett con31
tends, can depend on the context of the claim. Turning to Form 11
(formerly Form 9), which famously pleads negligence liability merely
by stating that “[o]n date, at place, the defendant negligently drove a
32
motor vehicle against the plaintiff,” Professor Hartnett suggests that
the Form’s stark simplicity can be viewed as a reflection of the familiarity of car-accident negligence claims—and he supports this insight
by citing Charles Clark for the proposition that even in the nineteenth
century equally simple allegations would have sufficed to ground a
33
negligence claim.

26

See id. at 1951 (rejecting as “bare assertions” Iqbal’s allegations that “petitioners
‘knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [him]’ to harsh
conditions of confinement ‘as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion,
race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest’” (alterations in
original)); id. (“On the facts respondent alleges the arrests Mueller oversaw were likely
lawful and justified by his nondiscriminatory intent to detain aliens who were illegally
present in the United States and who had potential connections to those who committed terrorist acts.”).
27
Id. at 1953.
28
Hartnett, supra note 10, at 481-83.
29
Id. at 483-84.
30
Id. at 484-85.
31
See id. at 492-93 (“[W]hat is ‘conclusory’ depends on the right of action on
which the claimant seeks relief and the conclusions that are necessary to relief under
that right of action.”).
32
FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11.
33
Hartnett, supra note 10, at 493-94.
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By contrast, in other contexts, the inferences that the plaintiff
wishes to draw from the facts in the complaint may not strike the
judge as plausible. The judge’s willingness to regard a particular inference as plausible, Professor Hartnett observes, may depend in part
34
on the judge’s own range of experience. And this has implications
for the advocate: “Twombly can be understood as inviting lawyers to
present information and argument designed to convince a judge that
35
what the judge thinks is ‘natural’ is not.” Professor Hartnett’s insight
is of central importance to lawyers who must now operate under a
post-Twombly regime. Given Twombly’s invitation to judges to police
36
the plausibility of inferences at the stage of the motion to dismiss,
advocates must do their best to explain their case in a way that, where
necessary, broadens the judge’s perspective.
But this insight also helps to explain why many commentators are
uncomfortable with both Twombly and Iqbal. Instead of broadening
the judge’s perspective, there is an alternative way to ensure that a
breadth of perspective is brought to bear on the inferences in the
case: namely, to send the case to the jury. Here it is helpful to recall
Justice Hunt’s discussion of the jury’s role in Sioux City & Pacific Rail37
road Co. v. Stout. Justice Hunt, writing for the Court, conceded that
in “extreme” cases “the necessary inference from the proof is so cer38
tain that it may be ruled as a question of law.” For example,
if a coachdriver intentionally drives within a few inches of a precipice,
and an accident happens, negligence may be ruled as a question of law.
On the other hand, if he had placed a suitable distance between his
coach and the precipice, but by the breaking of a rein or an axle, which
could not have been anticipated, an injury occurred, it might be ruled as
39
a question of law that there was no negligence and no liability.

But between such extreme cases lies a spectrum of other factual sce40
narios—“almost infinite in variety and extent” —in which the inferences to be drawn are properly for the jury.

34

Id. at 498-503.
Id. at 500.
36
See Burbank, supra note 15, at 540 (noting “the threat that legal indeterminacy
about the freedom of judges to police inferences presents to policies underlying both
the substantive law and the Seventh Amendment”).
37
84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1874).
38
Id. at 663.
39
Id.
40
Id.
35
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Twelve men of the average of the community, comprising men of education and men of little education, men of learning and men whose learning consists only in what they have themselves seen and heard, the merchant, the mechanic, the farmer, the laborer; these sit together, consult,
apply their separate experience of the affairs of life to the facts proven,
and draw a unanimous conclusion. This average judgment thus given it
is the great effort of the law to obtain. It is assumed that twelve men
know more of the common affairs of life than does one man, that they
can draw wiser and safer conclusions from admitted facts thus occurring
41
than can a single judge.

To the extent that Twombly encourages judges to dismiss cases at the
pleading stage on the ground that the plaintiff’s desired inferences
are implausible, the judgments that might otherwise be made by a jury
will instead be made by the judge. The concerns raised by such dismissals at the pleading stage are even starker than the similar concerns raised by the possible overuse of summary judgment, because
summary judgment ordinarily will not be granted without an oppor42
tunity for discovery.
Here, though, Professor Hartnett provides another central insight:
he points out that the pendency of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim does not ordinarily operate to delay discov43
ery. A plaintiff can plead the facts for which he or she already has
evidentiary support, and can also plead factual allegations that “will
likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for fur44
ther investigation or discovery.” By specifically identifying the latter
type of allegation (as required by Rule 11(b)(3)), the plaintiff “thereby focus[es] on the key issue of discovery to substantiate such allega45
tions.” Once attention is focused on the key areas where discovery is
needed in order to support those allegations, “[t]he court could allow
limited discovery, targeted at the identified allegation, and establish a
briefing schedule for any motion to dismiss that follows the comple46
The rigors of such an approach
tion of that limited discovery.”
41

Id. at 664.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f) (“If a party opposing the motion shows by affidavit that,
for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court
may: (1) deny the motion; (2) order a continuance to enable affidavits to be obtained,
depositions to be taken, or other discovery to be undertaken; or (3) issue any other
just order.”).
43
Hartnett, supra note 10, at 507.
44
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3).
45
Hartnett, supra note 10, at 505.
46
Id. at 509-10.
42
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might challenge plaintiffs who (prior to discovery) lack a deep knowledge of information that is uniquely within the defendant’s possession; but it could nonetheless give the skilled plaintiff’s lawyer an opportunity to pursue the information needed to flesh out key points in
the complaint. This might be particularly true if the plaintiff’s existing information comes from informants who are reluctant to be iden47
tified in the complaint but whose information could help the plaintiff’s lawyer to shape the course of targeted discovery.
Professor Hartnett thus identifies two ways in which, under Twombly and Iqbal, district judges retain discretion to permit claims to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, even where some
judges might view the plaintiff’s desired inferences with a skeptical
eye. First, the judge might take the plausibility standard as an invitation to consider a range of perspectives—some perhaps outside the
judge’s own experience—when evaluating the inferences that can be
48
drawn from the facts alleged in the complaint. Second, even if the
judge might not consider such inferences to be plausible on the facts
as alleged in the original complaint, the judge can provide an opportunity for discovery that may enable the plaintiff, by amendment, to
49
fill in gaps in the original complaint. But Professor Hartnett acknowledges frankly that these avenues for taming Twombly depend on
50
the discretion of the district judge. The district judges may cabin
Twombly, but who will cabin the district judges?
In The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination
Cases, Professor Schneider expands our consideration of trial-judge
discretion by examining three related contexts: pleading, summary
51
judgment, and expert testimony. She argues that in each of these
areas, developments over the past thirty years have augmented the district judge’s authority to reject claims of civil rights violations and employment discrimination. Part I of her article commences by reviewing empirical studies that indicate the challenges faced by federal52
court plaintiffs in such cases. Professor Schneider notes preliminary
47

See generally Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 711-12 (7th
Cir. 2008) (assessing a complaint’s use of information from confidential sources).
48
Hartnett, supra note 10, at 499-503.
49
Id. at 509-12.
50
Id. at 513-15.
51
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The
Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
517 (2010).
52
Id. at 524-26.
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findings showing that, even pre-Iqbal, courts were applying Twombly in
employment and civil rights cases and suggesting that Twombly’s appli53
cation in such cases was adversely affecting such claims. Professor
Schneider then highlights a number of decisions applying Iqbal in the
context of civil rights cases; her review of those decisions demonstrates
54
the broad discretion that Iqbal vests in district judges. Some judges,
she suggests, are taking Iqbal as a license to bring their own preconceptions concerning civil rights and employment discrimination
55
claims to bear on motions to dismiss such claims.
Turning to summary judgment, Professor Schneider describes a
similar dynamic. Here the question of judicial perspective—which
Professor Hartnett, too, has addressed in connection with pleading
decisions—recurs in connection with summary judgment.
[I]n civil rights or employment discrimination cases . . . where subtle issues
of credibility, inferences, and close legal questions may be involved, where
issues concerning the “genuineness” or “materiality” of facts are frequently
intertwined with law, a single district judge may be a less preferable decision maker than a jury. Juries are likely to be far more diverse and to bring
56
a broader range of perspectives to bear on the problem.

Moreover, Professor Schneider suggests, some judges take a mechanistic approach to evaluating summary judgment motions, analyzing
pieces of evidence in isolation from each other and failing to consider
57
the whole of the evidence in context. Such an approach differs from
that which jurors are likely to employ when deciding a case. Not only
will the jurors bring to the case a variety of life experiences (and thus
a range of perspectives) but it seems likely that jurors will tend to evaluate the case by fitting each piece of evidence into a narrative that
58
makes sense of the case as a whole.

53

Id. at 532.
Id. at 533-35.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 542-43.
57
Id. at 544.
58
See, e.g., Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision Making, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 192, 194
(Reid Hastie ed., 1993) (“The story model is based on the hypothesis that jurors impose
a narrative story organization on trial information. According to the theory, the story
will be constructed from three types of knowledge . . . : (A) case-specific information
acquired during the trial . . . ; (B) knowledge about events similar in content to those
that are the topic of dispute . . . ; and (C) generic expectations about what makes a
complete story (e.g., knowledge that human actions are usually motivated by goals).”).
54
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Professor Schneider aptly illustrates her argument by reference to
59
Scott v. Harris.
In Harris, the Supreme Court reversed the lower
courts’ denial of summary judgment for the defendant in a case aris60
ing from a high-speed chase. The Court’s ruling depended on the
view that “no reasonable jury” could fail to conclude from the evidence that “[t]he car chase that respondent initiated in this case
posed a substantial and immediate risk of serious physical injury to
others” and that the defendant’s “attempt to terminate the chase by
61
forcing respondent off the road was reasonable.” Justice Stevens’s
lone dissent asserted that “jurors in Georgia should be allowed to evaluate the reasonableness of the decision to ram respondent’s speeding
vehicle in a manner that created an obvious risk of death and has in
62
fact made him a quadriplegic at the age of 19.”
As Professor Schneider points out, a recent study by Dan Kahan,
David Hoffman, and Don Braman can illuminate our understanding
63
of the debate between Justice Stevens and the Harris majority. Professors Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman showed the video of the Harris
64
chase to 1350 people. They found that
[a] very sizable majority of our diverse, nationally representative sample
agreed with the Scott majority that Harris’s driving exposed the public
and the police to lethal risks, that Harris was more at fault than the police for putting the public in danger, and that deadly force ultimately was
65
reasonable to terminate the chase.

But they also discerned patterns among viewers in that majority and
among viewers who took the contrary view: “Individuals (particularly
white males) who hold hierarchical and individualist cultural
worldviews, who are politically conservative, who are affluent, and who
reside in the West were likely to form significantly more pro66
defendant risk perceptions.” By contrast,
[i]ndividuals who hold egalitarian and communitarian views, whose politics are liberal, who are well educated but likely less affluent, and whose

59

550 U.S. 372 (2007).
Id. at 386.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 397 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63
Schneider, supra note 51, at 547-48 & n.147 .
64
Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 841 (2009).
65
Id. at 879.
66
Id.
60
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ranks include disproportionately more African Americans and women . . . were significantly more likely to form pro-plaintiff views and to reject the conclusion that the police acted reasonably in using deadly force
67
to terminate the chase.

Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman criticize the grant of summary judgment in Harris on a number of grounds. One is that, even if we assume that in a given jury a majority of jurors might respond as a majority of the viewers did in the study, the jury’s deliberations could
provide an opportunity for those taking the minority view to persuade
68
those in the majority to reconsider their perceptions.
Professor Schneider’s analysis of summary judgment, then, suggests a conclusion similar to that which one might draw from Professor Hartnett’s discussion of motions to dismiss for failure to state a
claim. In both contexts, the judge’s ability to perceive a range of
perspectives other than her own may be vital in determining whether
the judge permits a case to proceed further—and thus, potentially, to
69
reach a jury that might embody that greater diversity of perspectives.
Likewise, Professor Hartnett’s suggestion that plaintiffs might use social science data to broaden the judge’s perspective at the Rule
70
12(b)(6) stage resonates with Professor Schneider’s observations
concerning the vital role that social scientists can play as experts in
71
discrimination cases. Professor Schneider’s article thus underscores
the importance of investigating the impact of the Daubert standard on
72
District
rulings concerning social science experts in such cases.
court rulings concerning such testimony may be particularly pivotal,
67

Id.
See id. at 885 (“The experience of interacting with others whose understandings
of social reality differ from theirs—and thus learning that their own understandings,
and hence their views of the facts, are partial—might cause jurors of diverse identities
to converge on a common view of the facts, particularly where one side’s initial view is
less intensely held than the other’s.”). Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman also suggest a
process value in denying summary judgment where an identifiable minority of potential jurors would disagree with the majority’s view of the appropriate case outcome. See
id. (“[ J]ury deliberation can invest law with democratic legitimacy even when factual
understandings born of diverse experiences and social influence persist.”).
69
Obviously, most federal cases do not go to trial even if they survive the Rule
12(b)(6) and summary judgment stages.
70
Hartnett, supra note 10, at 503.
71
Schneider, supra note 51, at 553-55.
72
See id. at 555 (noting that there is “less information on what is actually happening
with Daubert in the pretrial context than other aspects of pretrial procedure,” but suggesting that “there is good reason to believe that the lethal combination of Daubert and summary judgment has affected” civil rights and employment discrimination cases).
68
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Professor Schneider notes, because such rulings are reviewed only for
abuse of discretion (in contrast to summary judgment grants, which
73
are reviewed de novo). Professor Schneider also impresses upon us
the need to consider procedural devices as an interlocking set, and to
scrutinize proposed changes in those devices for signs that the
changes might disproportionately impact particular types of litigation
74
(such as employment discrimination or other civil rights cases). But
in the end, Professor Schneider, like Professor Hartnett, returns to
the importance of good judging—including the importance of a
judge’s openness to the perspectives of others whose experiences dif75
fer from her own.
If Professors Schneider and Hartnett invite us to study Twombly’s
pleading standard as part of an interconnected web of federal court
procedures, Professor Dodson calls on us to enlarge our focus by
comparing the United States’ approach to pleading with that employed in other countries. In Comparative Convergences in Pleading
Standards, Professor Dodson situates this invitation within the larger
project of the comparative study of civil procedure, and he thus begins by summarizing the benefits and challenges of that larger
76
project. Comparing the United States’ approach to those taken in
other common law jurisdictions and in civil law jurisdictions serves a
number of purposes. The comparison reveals the many ways in which
U.S. procedure is exceptional, and thus invites U.S. scholars to reconsider the range of procedural possibilities. Moreover, an examination
73

See id. at 551-52 (“Daubert rulings may be the preferred method of district court
resolution because they provide greater discretion for district court judges and less
chance of reversal on appeal.”). This insight also helps to address one question that
might arise concerning Professor Schneider’s earlier point about district court grants
of summary judgment. In one way, there might be a structural incentive not to grant
summary judgment: grants of summary judgment that end the entire case produce an
appealable judgment and thus raise the prospect of immediate appellate review, whereas denials ordinarily will not be immediately appealable. (An exception exists in certain contexts, such as some denials of motions based on qualified immunity.) The
prospect of immediate de novo appellate review might lessen the incentives for a district judge to grant summary judgment dismissing a case (though, admittedly, there
are contrary incentives, given that dismissing a case helps to clear the judge’s docket);
but if the grant of summary judgment is based upon the exclusion of the plaintiff’s expert witness’s testimony, then the operative reasoning that underpins the dismissal will
receive more deferential review.
74
Id. at 556-57.
75
Id. at 569.
76
See Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 441, 444-47 (2010).
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of the processes a society chooses for dispute resolution may reveal
broader and deeper differences concerning the presuppositions on
77
which the society is founded.
Having thus framed the pleading question within this broader
context, Professor Dodson notes the intriguing contrast between U.S.
pleading practices and those of other countries. The United States’
system of notice pleading contrasts sharply, he observes, with the
pleading requirements imposed in Germany, France, Japan, England,
78
and other countries. But, he notes, the comparative project must also recognize that a country’s procedure is likely to be dynamic rather
than static, and thus the project should entail not only a review of different countries’ current practices but also the study of changes in
79
each country’s practices. Accordingly, Professor Dodson insightfully
considers the development of the United States’ pleading practices
over time, noting the effects of the Supreme Court’s 1957 decision in
80
Conley v. Gibson as well as the Supreme Court’s more recent (preTwombly) decisions rejecting judicial efforts to impose heightened
81
pleading standards.
Professor Dodson comments that the comparative study of pleading practices is particularly apposite now, because the United States
has shown signs of shifting closer to the pleading approach adopted
by other countries. Here Professor Dodson draws together both legislative and case law developments. With respect to case law, Professor
Dodson recounts the debate over Twombly’s scope and merits, and he
82
discusses the Iqbal Court’s response to that debate. He observes that
Iqbal directs the application of Twombly across the board. He also asserts that Iqbal and Twombly “shift [the] focus from notice to facts,”
thus rendering federal pleading “more akin to foreign pleading re77

See, e.g., William B. Ewald, What’s So Special About American Law?, Keynote
Speech of the Annual Quinlan Lecture at the Oklahoma City University School of Law
(Mar. 29, 2001) (suggesting that “the deepest differences between the American and
the European legal systems are all linked, in one way or another, to . . . two different
ways of thinking about the state and popular democracy”), in 26 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
1083, 1100 (2001).
78
See Dodson, supra note 76, at 452 (stating that “no other country’s pleading requirements are so relaxed” as those of the United States).
79
Id. at 452 n.69.
80
355 U.S. 41 (1957); see Dodson, supra note 76, at 450-52.
81
See Dodson, supra note 76, at 451-52 & n.66 (discussing, inter alia, Leatherman
v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993),
and Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002)).
82
Id. at 457-62.
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83

gimes.” Here we find another synergy among the articles in this collection: Professor Hartnett’s reading of Twombly as directing a plausibility analysis that varies with the context of the case yields an important nuance for the comparative project. Professor Hartnett’s
observations that “[p]lausibility of inference is not the same as specificity of factual allegation” and that the plausibility test’s application
“will depend on what facts the substantive law makes material and on
84
the appropriate inferential connections between facts” give us reason
to think that we now have fact pleading for some things in some federal cases—not for all things in all federal cases. Professor Dodson
aptly picks up this thread when he notes that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard “has a different focus than the pleading regimes in
85
other countries.”
The Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard has not only a different focus but also, I suspect, a different set of justifications. Neither Twombly
nor Iqbal makes any attempt to justify the plausibility approach by reference to the existence of tougher pleading standards elsewhere in
the world. Perhaps ironically, a number of the Justices who favor the
new pleading test deplore reliance on foreign law, and vice versa. Justices Scalia and Thomas—who voted with the majority in both Twombly
and Iqbal—have asserted (albeit in a different context) that the notion
“that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the
86
Conversely, Justice
world . . . ought to be rejected out of hand.”
Ginsburg—who dissented in both cases—has argued with respect to
constitutional adjudication that “[w]e are the losers if we do not both
87
share our experience with, and learn from others.” The Justices have
not taken their dispute over foreign sources into the pleading field;
rather, they have couched the pleading debate—at least so far—in
domestic terms. But perhaps future cases will give them an occasion
to heed Professor Dodson’s suggestion that “[p]leadings convergence,
particularly if justified by comparative sources, may go a long way to-

83

Id. at 462-63.
Hartnett, supra note 10, at 495-96.
85
Dodson, supra note 76, at 463.
86
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.
& Thomas, J., dissenting).
87
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative
Perspective In Constitutional Adjudication, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 1 (2003).
84
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ward making a good-faith showing of willingness to join the interna88
tional conversation on civil procedure.”
As Professor Dodson points out, the shift in Twombly and Iqbal toward a more rigorous pleading standard parallels similar statutory developments. In the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA), Congress imposed a heightened pleading standard for
89
fraud claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. And in the
Y2K Act, Congress set heightened pleading requirements for certain
claims of harm arising from computer failures in connection with the
90
start of the year 2000.
Professor Dodson’s juxtaposition of these three pleading developments is illuminating in several ways. First, it directs our attention
to the source of the pleading requirement. When a heightened
pleading requirement is confined to a particular subject area and is
imposed by the body that also creates the substantive rules of law for
that subject area—as was true in the case of the PSLRA—that might be
thought to raise fewer concerns than would the judicial creation of a
heightened pleading requirement that may apply to many types of
claims and that may affect the vindication of rights created by the
91
Constitution or by statute.
Second, viewing Twombly, Iqbal, the PSLRA, and the Y2K Act together prompts us to heed Professor Dodson’s call for a comparison
not only of federal with foreign procedure but also of federal with
92
state procedure. In the case of the PSLRA, it becomes clear that we
cannot understand or predict the effects of procedural change in the
federal courts without also considering the procedures available in
state courts. Plaintiffs frustrated by the PSLRA’s procedural hurdles—
such as its imposition of a stay of discovery pending the disposition of
93
a motion for summary judgment—found their way into state courts.
Congress responded in 1998 by enacting the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, which preempts “covered class actions” under state
88

Dodson, supra note 76, at 469-70.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2006).
90
Id. §§ 6602, 6607.
91
See generally Burbank, supra note 20, at 1731-32 (discussing the PSLRA as an example of substance-specific procedural lawmaking by Congress).
92
Dodson, supra note 76, at 471.
93
See generally Richard H. Walker et al., The New Securities Class Action: Federal Obstacles, State Detours, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 641, 677-80 (1997) (explaining that “[t]he strictures of the [PSLRA] have led some plaintiffs’ attorneys to seek a detour around the
obstacles in federal court by turning to state forums”).
89
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94

law and authorizes federal courts hearing claims under the Securities
Act of 1933 or the Securities Act of 1934 to stay state-court discovery
95
under some circumstances. And when enacting the Y2K Act in 1999,
Congress imposed its heightened pleading requirements not only on
96
federal court actions but also on state court actions. Congress’s legis97
lative forays into state-court procedure raise constitutional questions,
but they also show an awareness that procedural reform in the federal
courts requires consideration not only of federal court procedures but
also of the procedures offered in competing state court fora.
Third, experience under the PSLRA may help to illustrate the
connections between private litigation and other forms of regulation.
Professor Dodson makes this connection clear, noting that the optimal degree of court access for private litigants may sometimes depend
in part on the extent to which government regulators stand ready to
98
enforce the substantive law. This insight suggests that one interesting avenue for research might explore the extent to which the
PSLRA’s barriers to private securities litigation roughly coincided with
a decrease in government regulation of the securities markets, and
might also explore the extent to which both of these trends, in conjunction, may have contributed to recent economic developments.
So far I have only sketched the vistas that Professor Dodson’s article opens for research concerning procedure within the United
States. But of course his article is equally thought provoking with respect to the pleading practices in other countries. His survey of those
countries’ pleading practices prompts us to ask what, in the U.S. experience, produces our anomalous practice of notice pleading, and what
94

See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1) (“No covered class action based upon the statutory or
common law of any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in any State or
Federal court by any private party alleging . . . (A) a misrepresentation or omission of a
material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security; or (B) that
the defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.”).
95
See id. § 77z-1(b)(4) (1933 Act) (“Upon a proper showing, a court may stay discovery proceedings in any private action in a State court as necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments, in an action subject to a stay of discovery pursuant to this subsection.”); id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(D) (1934 Act) (setting forth a
similar provision).
96
See id. § 6602(1)(A) (defining Y2K actions to include certain civil actions “commenced in any Federal or State court”); id. § 6607 (setting heightened pleading requirements for Y2K actions).
97
See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE
L.J. 947, 953-55 (2001) (discussing, inter alia, constitutional issues raised by the Y2K Act).
98
Dodson, supra note 76, at 468.
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the result would be if we were to abandon it. Here Professor Dodson
aptly notes that procedural mechanisms operate as a system, and that
it is difficult to analyze any one component of the system in isolation
99
from the others.
Professor Dodson’s article thus calls on us to consider the ways in
which a country allocates the enforcement of its substantive law. For
example, a country in which public enforcement of certain types of
legal obligations is relatively strong may rely less on private enforcement of such obligations and that balance may help to explain features that restrict private litigants’ access to the courts to litigate such
claims. Here Professor Dodson’s observations about overseas developments in aggregate litigation are particularly intriguing because
they suggest that in some foreign countries this balance may be shifting, in the sense that some countries outside the United States are in
fact experimenting with an expansion of their use of private suits to
100
supplement governmental regulation.
Likewise, Professor Dodson prompts us to consider the ways in
which pleading standards link to other mechanisms within the litigation system, such as discovery, summary judgment, and evidentiary
standards. Reading Professor Dodson’s article in conjunction with
those by Professor Hartnett and Professor Schneider is illuminating in
that respect, given that Professors Hartnett and Schneider underscore
the connections among those devices. In addition, Professors
Schneider and Hartnett have focused us on the ways in which the
choice and application of a pleading standard affects the division of
tasks between judge and jury. In systems that do not have (or have only recently acquired) a jury system, we might expect that a heightened
pleading standard would have a different valence. Professor Dodson’s
comparative analysis also raises questions about the relevance of judicial and lawyerly culture. Do differences in the ways that judges are
trained, selected, and retained affect the workings of a country’s
pleading standard? Might the nature of the local bar influence the
101
way in which a pleading standard is applied in practice?
99

Id. at 463-64.
Id. at 470 (“Other countries are experimenting with aggregate litigation,
another quintessentially American phenomenon.”).
101
Professor Jolowicz, for instance, notes that
100

in England the main responsibility for pleadings and for the conduct of litigation rested, and still rests to a large extent, with the relatively small number of
lawyers who practise as barristers, while the judges and the Masters, a small
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Professor Dodson thus challenges procedure scholars to embark
upon a research program that is as important as it is ambitious. The
comparison of U.S. and foreign procedure will enrich the domestic
debate over matters such as pleading standards. In some instances,
such a comparison may prompt U.S. policymakers to adopt a mechanism employed by other countries, such as a heightened pleading requirement. As Professor Dodson’s thoughtful discussion suggests, the
transplanted mechanism may well function differently in its new environment. We might think of the transplant as the top layer of a
Twombly painting, which receives some of its meaning from the
erased or partially obscured layers beneath it.
This brief Foreword has not done justice to any of the articles in
this collection. But I hope that it has indicated the importance of
each author’s contribution as well as the synergies among their three
projects. Professor Hartnett provides litigators with key strategic insights through his close reading of Twombly’s plausibility requirement
and through his exploration of the uses of targeted discovery pending
the disposition of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, but
he also concludes that the success of such strategies will rest largely
within the discretion of the district judge. Professor Schneider takes
up the theme of judicial discretion and considers how that discretion
manifests itself through the interconnections among Rule 12(b)(6)
motions, summary judgment motions, and evidentiary rulings concerning expert testimony. Her exploration underscores the importance of examining how the exercise of that discretion may affect employment discrimination and other civil rights cases. Professor
Dodson’s comparative analysis of pleading standards urges scholars to
deepen and broaden their analysis of U.S. procedure by measuring it
against the practices in other countries. Not only is his thoughtful investigation of this question an important step in advancing this project,
but that investigation fits naturally with the other two articles in this collection by inviting us to enrich our comparative analysis through a consideration of the ways in which each discrete procedural element connects to other parts of the relevant country’s procedural system.

and homogeneous group of people, were, and to a large extent still are, former members of the Bar. However strong the adversary idea may be, within
such a context there are social and professional pressures whose tendency is to
discourage excessive and unreasonable attempts to take advantage of an opponent’s technical or formal mistakes.
J.A. JOLOWICZ, ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 40-41 (2000).

